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I. INTRODUCTION
The legitimacy of the practice of impleading non-maritime
causes of action in admiralty cases has ridden both peaks and
* Copyright. All rights reserved by Ernesto J. de la F6.
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troughs on the waves of maritime legal history. The recently re-
newed acceptability of this concept of law is anchored in now-an-
cient admiralty case law that is at the root of all modern American
third-party practice, both civil and admiralty.1
The first court to hand down a reported opinion on the subject
held that a defending party in an admiralty action was able to im-
plead a third party where his claim against that party was based
on a common law cause of action.2 The court's rationale for the
acceptance of this practice finds its parallel in the modern concept
commonly expressed by the phrase "in the interest of judicial
economy."3
The practice was soon discarded for reasons which could only
be explained in terms of an attempt on the part of the admiralty
courts to maintain the exclusivity of the admiralty jurisdiction.
The merger of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the Admi-
ralty Rules in 1966 served as the catalyst which brought about the
eventual change in the law. Legal precedent re-established a de-
fendant's right to implead additional parties into an admiralty ac-
tion, whether or not those parties' liabilities were based upon a
maritime claim.4 While some early post-merger cases attempted to
maintain the old concept of separate jurisdiction, these opinions
were criticized in dicta and finally discredited in 1982.1
This Comment attempts to track the historical development of
third-party practice in admiralty, including early acceptance and
the later rejection of jurisdiction over impleaded non-maritime
claims. It then traces modern legal precedent including the early
post-merger decisions which rejected this form of ancillary juris-
diction. It concludes with an analysis of Joiner v. Diamond M.
Drilling Co.,6 which once again established the legitimacy of the
practice. The intent of this Comment is to update the reader on
the current status of the law and to acquaint the reader with its
legal evolution since the subject was last treated in the law reviews,
no less than a dozen years ago.'
1. The Hudson, 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
2. Evans v. New York & P.S.S. Co., 163 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
3. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Joiner v. Diamond M. Drilling
Co., 677 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982).
4. Joiner v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 688 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1982).
5. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971).
6. 688 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1982).
7. Landers, By Sleight of Rule: Admiralty Unification and Ancillary and Pendent Ju-





The origins of admiralty impleader lie in the case of The Hud-
son.' The Hudson court, "in the interest of expediency, directness,
and effectualness," permitted the libellee in a collision case to
serve process upon a vessel which might have been equally as liable
to the libellant as the libellee was himself. The court reasoned that
collision cases were sui generis, where the question of liability was
best determined in a single action in which testimony could be
taken from witnesses on both vessels. Because no rule of procedure
expressly allowed impleader of third parties at the time of The
Hudson, the court fashioned its own rule. It relied on a rule of
admiralty procedure which recognized the power of the court to
regulate its practice "in such manner as it shall deem most expedi-
ent for the due administration of justice."' 0
The seeds for such a ruling had been sown by the Supreme
Court of the United States six years earlier in a decision which
stated that a libellant could recover all his collision damages from
a single offending vessel." The Hudson court recognized the harsh-
ness of a rule which imposed liability on a single vessel, where
sometimes another was equally or more at fault. The court fash-
ioned a novel and equitable solution to the problems of this rule.
It is generally acknowledged that ancient Admiralty Rule 59,
predecessor of old Admiralty Rule 56 and also modern Rule 14 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, grew out of the decision in
The Hudson.'" This conclusion is supported by the fact that when
Admiralty Rule 59 was first codified in 1889, the rule was made
applicable only to collision cases.' 3 By the time the rule was offi-
cially adopted, its application was expanded to include impleader
in contract cases.' 4 The expansion was carried out by the courts
tions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1950); Note, Admiralty Practice After Unification: Barnacles
on the Procedural Hull, 81 YALE L. J. 1154 (1972).
8. 15 F. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1883).
9. Id. at 176.
10. Id.
11. The "Atlas", 93 U.S. 302 (1876).
12. Fifty-ninth rule in Admiralty, 29 S.Ct. XLVI; also see generally C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: § 1465 (1971).
13. Id.
14. The Alert, 40 F. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1889).
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"in the interest of speedy, complete, and convenient administra-
tion of justice"."
The first successful attempt to implead an additional party
based on a non-maritime claim in an admiralty action occurred in
1906, in the case of Evans v. New York & P.S.S. Co.' The libellant
had shipped rubber on a vessel whose owners had leased a dock-
side warehouse for storage purposes from a third party. The rubber
was stolen from this warehouse before the shipper's agent had ar-
ranged for pick-up. Consequently, the shipper libelled the carrier
in admiralty based upon its maritime contract of carriage. Subse-
quently, the carrier impleaded the warehouseman for indemnity.
The court held that the libellee could implead the third party
warehouseman even though his status was only that of a common
law bailee for hire. Neither of the original parties to the libel could
have maintained an original action against the warehouseman in
admiralty, because neither a maritime contract nor a maritime tort
was involved. The court permitted the impleader "in order to pre-
vent circuity of action and multiplicity of suits" and to do com-
plete justice in the manner of equity courts. 17
The Evans decision was followed in several subsequent cases.
The decision, however, was then criticized twelve years later by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in The Ada.' 8 The Second Cir-
cuit's disapproval was based on its belief in the separateness of the
civil and maritime jurisdictions of the federal courts. Judge Hough,
who authored the opinion in Evans, dissented from The Ada
court's treatment of Evans, which implied that admiralty had no
power to implead a non-maritime surety or party responsible-over
"under the equity of the fifty-ninth rule."' 9
Two years after The Ada, the United States Supreme Court
proposed Admiralty Rule 56 as a replacement for Rule 59.20 Since
the time of its adoption, Rule 59 had been liberally expanded to
encompass not only collision cases, but all cases in admiralty. Pro-
posed Rule 56 was an effort to codify this extended use of im-
pleader. The new rule allowed the defending party to implead any
third party liable to him for all or any portion of the claimant's
15. Id.
16. 163 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
17. Id. at 407.
18. 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918).
19. Id. at 198, 199.
20. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12, at 339-52.
[Vol. 17:2
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claim. In addition, the rule provided for substitution of defendants
who were directly liable to the claimant.2
This rule, adopted in March of 1921, became the subject of
dicta in two cases decided by the Second Circuit in 1922. Judge
Ward's opinion in The Goyaz22 reiterated his reasons for disap-
proval of the Evans doctrine as expressed in The Ada. 23 After giv-
ing proper regard to stare decisis by citing The Ada's rejection of
impleader of non-maritime claims in admiralty, The Goyaz court
constructed a constitutional argument for rejecting the Evans doc-
trine.24 The court first stated that Congress, by way of the Act of
August 23, 1842, gave the Supreme Court authority to merely reg-
ulate practice in the federal courts. No authority was granted to
enact substantive law.2 5 The Supreme Court did not intend to en-
21. Admiralty Rule 56 provided:
In any suit, whether in rem or in personam, the claimant or respondent (as the
case may be) shall be entitled to bring in any other vessel or person (individual
or corporation) who may be partly or wholly liable either to the libellant or to
such claimant or respondent by way of remedy over, contribution or otherwise,
growing out of the same matter. This shall be done by petition, on oath,
presented before or the time of answering the libel, or at any later time during
the progress of the cause that the court may allow. Such petition shall contain
suitable allegations showing such liability, and the particulars thereof, and that
such other vessel, or person ought to be proceeded against in the same suit for
such damage, and shall pray that process be issued against such vessel or person
to that end. Thereupon such process shall issue, and if duly served, such suit
shall proceed as if such vessel or person had been originally proceeded against;
the other parties in the suit shall answer the petition; the claimant of such vessel
or such new party shall answer the libel; and such further proceedings shall be
had and decree rendered by the court in the suit as to law and justice shall
appertain. But every such petitioner shall, upon filing his petition, give a stipula-
tion, with sufficient sureties, or an approved corporate surety, to pay the libel-
lant and to any claimant or any new party brought in by virtue of such process,
all such costs, damages, and expenses as shall be awarded against the petitioner
by the court on the final decree, whether rendered in the original or appellate
court; and any such claimant or new party shall give the same bonds or stipula-
tions which are required in the like cases from parties brought in under process
issued on the prayer of a libellant.
22. 281 F. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
23. 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918).
24. The argument was based upon the deprivation of an impleaded third party's right
to a jury trial guaranteed by the seventh amendment of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
25. Act of August 23, 1842, SESS. II CH. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 518 stated:
And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court shall have full power and
authority, from time to time, to prescribe, and regulate, and alter, the forms of
writs and other process to be used and issued in the district and circuit courts of
the United States, and the forms and modes of framing and filing libels, bills,
answers, and other proceedings and pleadings, in suits at common law or in ad-
miralty and in equity pending in the said courts, and also the forms and modes
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2
act substantive law in the newly enacted Admiralty Rule 56.26 Fur-
thermore, the court stated in dicta that any construction of the
new Rule 56, enacting substantive law, would have two ramifica-
tions that were beyond the power of the Supreme Court to effect:
First, it would extend the jurisdiction of the district courts;27 sec-
ond, it would deprive an impleaded third party of his constitution-
ally-guaranteed right to a jury trial.28 At the time, the right to a
jury trial was totally nonexistent on the "Admiralty Side".
The Second Circuit in Aktieselskabet Fido v. Lloyd
Braziliero29 rubber stamped Judge Ward's opinion in The Goyaz.5 °
During the next forty-four years it remained settled law that,
under Rule 56, the parties to a libel in admiralty enjoyed liberal
impleader in an admiralty cause of action. The same third party
could not be brought in at common law, civil, equitable, or statu-
tory causes of action.
In 1966, unification of the Civil and Admiralty Rules drasti-
cally changed the face of the issues decided in the early part of the
century. A court dealing with those issues for the first time, would
confront, on the civil side, the modern concepts of ancillary juris-
diction and third-party practice and, on the admiralty side, the ex-
tensive inroads into the long standing tradition of jury-less trials.
After unification, the federal courts were armed with Rule 14 of
of taking and obtaining evidence, and of obtaining discovery, and generally the
forms and drawing up, entering, and enrolling decrees, and the forms and modes
of proceeding before trustees appointed by the court, and generally to regulate
the whole practice of the said courts, so as to prevent delays, and to promote
brevity and succinctness in all pleadings and proceedings therein, and to abolish
all unnecessary costs and expenses in any suit therein.
26. Admiralty Rule 59 provided in pertinent part:
In a suit for damage by collision, if the claimant of any vessel proceeded against,
or any respondent proceeded against in personam, shall, by petition, on oath,
presented before or at the time of answering the libel, or within such further
time as the court may allow and containing suitable allegations showing fault or
negligence in any other vessel contributing to the same collision, and the partic-
ulars thereof, and that such other vessel or any other party ought to be pro-
ceeded against in the same suit for such damage, pray that such process be is-
sued against such vessel or party to that end, such process may be issued, and, if
duly served, such suit shall proceed as if such vessel or party had been originally
proceeded against; the other parties in the suit shall answer the petition; the
claimant of such vessel or such new party shall answer the libel; and such fur-
ther proceedings shall be had and decree rendered by the court in the suit as to
law and justice shall appertain ....
27. The Goyaz, 281 F. at 261.
28. Id.
29. 283 F. 62 (2d Cir. 1922).
30. 281 F. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ' Rule 14 retained the third-
party practice of the civil side and added a subsection to encom-
pass the broad third party practice of the admiralty side.32 This
was the state of the law when the first post-unification case to con-
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 14 provides:
(a) When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after com-
mencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause
a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
The third-party plaintiff need not obtain leave to make the service if he files the
third-party complaint not later than 10 days after he serves his original answer.
Otherwise he must obtain leave on motion upon notice to all parties to the ac-
tion. The person served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinaf-
ter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party
plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-
party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided
in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any de-
fenses which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiffs claim. The third-party
defendant may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the
third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party
defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party de-
fendant thereupon shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his coun-
terclaims and cross-claims as provided in Rule 13. Any party may move to strike
the third-party claim, or for its severance or separate trial. A third-party defend-
ant may proceed under this rule against any person not a party to the action
who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the claim made in the action
against the third-party defendant. The third-party complaint, if within the ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction, may be in rem against a vessel, cargo, or other
property subject to admiralty or maritime process in rem, in which case refer-
ences in this rule to the summons include the warrant of arrest, and references
to the third-party plaintiff or defendant include, where appropriate, the claim-
ant of the property arrested.
(b) When Plaintiff May Bring in Third Party. When a counterclaim is as-
serted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under
circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.
(c) Admiralty and Maritime Claims. When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty
or maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) the defendant or claimant, as
a third-party plaintiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly
or partly liable, either to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of
remedy over, contribution, or otherwise on account of the same transaction, oc-
currence, or series of transactions or occurrences. In such a case the third-party
plaintiff may also demand judgment against the third-party defendant in favor
of the plaintiff, in which event the third-party defendant shall make his defenses
to the claim of the plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party plaintiff in the
manner provided in Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff had
commenced it against the third-party defendant as well as the third-party
plaintiff.
32. See id. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
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front the issue, McCann v. Falgout Boat Co.,3 was decided in the
Southern District of Texas.
B. Post-Unification History
1. McCann v. Falgout Boat
In McCann v. Falgout Boat Co.,34 a seaman brought suit to
recover damages for injuries sustained while aboard a vessel on
which he was employed. The seaman fractured his right hand
while the ship was in a Japanese port. After receiving initial treat-
ment for the injury from a Japanese doctor, the seaman, McCann,
a citizen of Texas, was sent home to San Antonio, where a local
doctor continued to treat him over the next five months. The sea-
man brought suit against the operator of the vessel, alleging negli-
gence and/or unseaworthiness, and identifying his claim as arising
under the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, pursuant to
Rule 9(b)35 of the recently merged Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. He alleged a loss of earning capacity and claimed damages
for pain, suffering, and mental anguish.
The defendant vessel operator, Falgout Boat Company, filed a
third-party complaint against the local doctor, Dr. Metzner alleg-
ing that the doctor's medical malpractice was to blame for any
residual disability suffered by the seaman. Pursuant to Rule 14,36
the vessel operator claimed that the doctor was directly liable to
the seaman. In addition, the operator claimed that if Falgout Boat
was found to be liable to the plaintiff,37 then the boat company was
entitled to indemnification and/or contribution from the doctor.
Falgout Boat did not allege any independent basis of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in the third party complaint, admiralty or
otherwise.3 8 Instead, the operator relied upon the district court's
ability to decide the issues raised by the third-party complaint
under principles of ancillary jurisdiction."
33. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
34. Id.
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
36. See supra note 31.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a)-(c).
38. No jurisdictional allegations were made by Falgout Boat in the third-party com-
plaint to establish: a) federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; b) diversity juris-
diction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332; nor, c) admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333.
39. For a discussion of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction see C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FED-
ERAL COURTS § 9, at 28-32 (4th ed. 1983).
[Vol. 17:2
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The McCann court held that there could be no impleader of
non-maritime causes of action where the original claim was
brought under admiralty jurisdiction.41 The court determined that
the recent merger of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with the
Admiralty Rules was not a complete merger, and that a part of the
historical division between admiralty and civil practice was meant
to be retained.4 1
In McCann, Judge Noel advanced two lines of reasoning in
support of his decision not to allow the exercise of ancillary juris-
diction over the non-maritime cause of action. The court's first line
of reasoning was composed of several factors: a) The actual lan-
guage adopted and incorporated into the rule governing third-
party practice in the admiralty courts; b) historical pre-merger in-
terpretations of the rule; c) Supreme Court sanctioned rules of
construction; and d) the silence of the Federal Rules Advisory
Committee with regard to matters affecting jurisdiction.4 2 The
court's second argument served to buttress the first. This argu-
ment was based upon the court's conviction that an impleaded
third party brought into an admiralty case under a non-maritime
claim would be deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial.43
The court proceeded to make assumptions in support of these lines
of reasoning.
(a) The Court's Perceived Limits of Rule 14. Under its first
line of reasoning, the court assumed that third-party practice in
admiralty cases was governed by subsection (c) of Rule 14, to the
exclusion of the other subsections of the rule."" Prior to the merger
of the rules, third-party practice on the civil side of the federal
courts was governed by subsections (a) and (b) of Rule 14, which
allowed impleader of persons liable to defending parties for the
claims against them.
For years the civil side of the federal courts had exercised an-
cillary jurisdiction over third-party claims where there was no in-
dependent form of federal subject matter jurisdiction."5 Third-
40. The opinion contained an extended discussion of the court's understanding of con-
stitutional principles, statutory language, Supreme Court interpretations, historical prece-
dents, Federal Rules, and Advisory Committee notes and intentions.
41. McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 38.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 31.
45. The concept has its origins in the case of Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270
U.S. 593 (1926); see Note, The Ancillary Concept and the Federal Rules, 64 HARV. L. REV.
1986] 283
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party practice in the federal courts is one of the justifications for
the existence of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction."' The Mc-
Cann court would not exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the com-
mon law third-party claim when federal jurisdiction was estab-
lished "in admiralty. '" 7
Judge Noel's assumption that Rule 14(c) was the exclusive
regulator of third-party practice in admiralty cases resulted in his
reasoning that history and the conventional wisdom of statutory
construction necessitated the incorporation of pre-merger admi-
ralty practice into post-merger federal practice.4" The court rea-
soned that Rule 14(c) was patterned after pre-merger Admiralty
Rule 56,"9 which a majority of admiralty courts interpreted as per-
mitting impleader of only maritime causes of action where the
main claim was brought "in admiralty."50 This restriction was un-
derstandable within the context of the separate "sides" of the pre-
merger federal courts. The admiralty side was kept separate for
the purpose of maintaining a court system which would sustain the
uniformity of maritime law throughout the world.51 The restric-
tion, however, makes little sense in a merged court system. Com-
mentators have since stated that Rule 14(c) was actually added to
the Federal Rules in order to preserve the broadness of admiralty
impleader under the former Admiralty Rule 56, with its provisions
for substituting defendants, and should not be interpreted so nar-
rowly as to restrict impleader. 52
The final element of the first line of reasoning was the court's
view that the shift away from a pre-merger construction of Rule 56
served as an expansion of the jurisdiction of the district courts.
968, 969-71 (1951).
46. Additionally, ancillary jurisdiction can be invoked to support counterclaims and
cross-claims under FED. R. Civ. P. 13 where subject matter jurisdiction is otherwise not in
the federal courts.
47. McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 44.
48. Id. at 40-41.
49. J. Noel felt it proper to construe Rule 14(c) in light of the case law interpreting
former Admiralty Rule 56. He noted that the Advisory Committee on the unification had
never expressed any desire to change the practice and, in addition, that the Supreme Court
had stated many times that a prior interpretation of a statute was deemed to have legisla-
tive approval if the statutory provision was reenacted without material change. The court
assumed that the same standard would apply in the construction of a federal rule.
50. Compare Admiralty Rule 56, supra note 21, with FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c), supra note
31, § (c).
51. See generally G. GiMoRE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-5, at 1-14 (2d
ed. 1975).
52. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12.
[Vol. 17:2
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Rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stated expressly
that the rules should not be construed to extend such jurisdic-
tion."3 Consistent within the framework of this view, the court
found that the broader construction of jurisdiction would violate
Rule 82 and would extend beyond the limitations placed upon that
jurisdiction by the United States Constitution. s5
(b) The Jury Issue. The McCann court's second line of rea-
soning was the court's objection to the fact that a third party, im-
pleaded into an admiralty action on a state common law or statu-
tory claim, would be denied their constitutional right to trial by
jury.55 This conclusion was based on the court's assumption that
the non-maritime character of a third-party claim was swallowed-
up by the maritime nature of the main claim.56 Therefore, both the
maritime and non-maritime claim would become cognizable as ad-
miralty or maritime claims under Rule 9(h). 7
Judge Noel looked to both the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act of 1789 to support the conclusion that federal admiralty juris-
diction was meant to function without a jury.58 The opinion stated
that most courts continued to follow the tradition of disallowing
juries in admiralty cases. The court found little value in a five year
old Supreme Court pronouncement, that neither the Constitution,
statutes, nor Civil or Admiralty Rules of Procedure forbade jury
trials.5 9 This reasoning was the basis for the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co. that in maritime
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein. An admiralty or
maritime claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h) shall not be treated as a civil
action for the purposes of Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1391-93.
54. McCann, at 44 F.R.D. at 41.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
56. See McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 42.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) provides:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the district court on
some other ground may contain a statement identifying the claim as an admi-
ralty or maritime claim for the purposes of Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, and the Sup-
plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims. If the claim is cog-
nizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty or maritime claim for those purposes
whether so identified or not. The amendment of a pleading to add or withdraw
an identifying statement is governed by the principles of Rule 15. The reference
in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), to admiralty cases shall be construed to mean
admiralty and maritime claims within the meaning of this subdivision (h).
58. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9; U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
59. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
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cases, where the traditional maintenance and cure6" cause of action
of a seaman was joined with Jones Acts' and unseaworthiness 62
counts, all counts, including the one for maintenance and cure,
would go to the jury. 3
The McCann court was convinced that the Supreme Court ac-
quiesced to the tradition of disallowing a demand for a jury trial in
admiralty cases.6 The McCann opinion cited the Fitzgerald
Court's failure to adopt any special provisions to allow jury trials
in admiralty cases at unification of the Admiralty and Civil
Rules.6 Indeed, Federal Rule 38(e), promulgated by the Supreme
Court, stated: "These rules shall not be construed to create a right
to trial by jury of the issues in an admiralty and maritime claim
within the meaning of Rule 9(h). 6 The McCann court's conclu-
sion that the federal courts could not exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over non-maritime causes of action was based upon the following
assumptions: a) The character change of the claim from non-mari-
time to maritime under Rule 9(h), coupled with; b) the prohibition
in Rule 38(e) against any construction creating a right to trial by
jury. The court refused to "deny" an impleaded third party's right
to a jury trial, stating: "The right of a party to trial by jury, where
permitted, is sacrosanct.
67
Commentators, writing retrospectively, have noted that the di-
lemma over the jury question would have been the same whether
jurisdiction over the third-party claim was obtained under any
form of federal non-admiralty jurisdiction or ancillary jurisdic-
tion.6 8 They have also stated that Fitzgerald v. United States
Lines6' could be viewed as having created a right to trial by jury in
admiralty cases prior to the unification of the rules.70 As such, no
violation of Rule 38(e) occurred where the right to jury trial pre-
existed the rule.
60. See generally G. GIMoRE & C. BLACK, supra note 51, § 6-6.
61. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
62. See supra note 60, §§ 9-18(a).
63. The unseaworthiness counts were already triable to a jury. See Fitzgerald, 374 U.S.
at 20.
64. McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 43-44.
65. Id.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(e).
67. McCann, 44 F.R.D. at 44.
68. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12.
69. 374 U.S. 16 (1963) (extending the right to a jury trial to a maintenance and cure
claim).
70. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12.
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2. Leather's Best v. S.S. Mormaclynx
Three years later, the McCann decision was challenged by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Leather's Best, Inc. v.
S.S. Mormaclynx.71 In Leather's Best none of the parties argued
jurisdictional questions to the court, yet, sua sponte, the court
brought the jurisdictional issues to the forefront of its opinion. The
court used the opportunity to define the future of both pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction in admiralty based on the court's own
philosophy of the issues. Only the issues relating to pendent juris-
diction were decided in the case, however, because the question of
ancillary jurisdiction was not properly before the court at the
time .72
In Leather's Best, a company shipping eleven tons of leather
brought suit against a shipper and its agents to recover the value
of shipment which the carrier brought from Germany and deliv-
ered to its subsidiary terminal operator. The container in which
the leather was shipped and stored disappeared from the terminal.
It was later found empty twenty-five miles away from the terminal.
The court held that there was no admiralty jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's claim against the terminal operator because that opera-
tor was not a party to the maritime contract of carriage. State law
claims against the terminal operator, however, could be heard by
the federal court under a theory of pendent jurisdiction. 3
The court's opinion later served as the basis for accepting an-
cillary jurisdiction over state law claims in admiralty. The follow-
ing case notation greatly influenced future court decisions on this
question, and caused a dramatic turnaround of the original direc-
tion taken by the courts.
The effect of merger upon the former admiralty requirement of
independent jurisdiction for impleader has not yet been conclu-
sively resolved .... But if we were presented with the question,
it would be only with the greatest reluctance that we would con-
clude that under the merged rules the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction did not extend to admiralty as well as civil im-
pleader .... Certainly the practical considerations which sup-
port the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of civil
71. 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
72. Leather's Best remains the leading case in the maritime field, standing for the pro-
position that pendent jurisdiction is cognizable in maritime litigation.
73. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 39, § 19.
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impleader are equally persuasive on the admiralty side. . . . In
any event, we do not perceive the requirement of independent
jurisdiction in pre-merger admiralty impleader to have had con-
stitutional underpinnings. Rather it reflected a judicial concep-
tion of the limited nature of Admiralty Rule 56 and the appro-
priate reach of the then distinct admiralty jurisdiction. . . .4
III. THE MOVE TOWARD RECOGNITION OF THE JURISDICTION
In 1973, almost two years after the Leather's Best decision,
Judge Noel addressed the same issue in Stinson v. McKay75 that
he had addressed in McCann v. Falgout Boat.7 6 The judge held
steadfastly to his opinions in McCann, and barely gave recognition
to the criticism leveled by the court in Leather's Best." Judge
Noel dismissed the third-party complaint for lack of federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction, while relying on his holding in McCann for the
denial of ancillary jurisdiction.7 8
Practically, the court never needed to reach a decision on the
last point, because Rule 14(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure provides the authority to grant the dismissal.7 9 The two dis-
tinct and unrelated events80 which formed the bases of the main
claim and third-party claims, occurred fifteen months apart from
each other. They did not arise out of the same transaction or oc-
currences as required for proper joinder under Rule 14(c).81 Im-
pleader of those causes of action would have been improper even
without the court's reference to the issue of ancillary jurisdiction.
The court viewed this case as an opportunity to revisit and rebut
some of the criticism of the McCann decision.
During the period of 1974 through 1976, the Courts of Appeal
for the Third and Fifth Circuits pondered the question of whether
the federal courts could exercise ancillary jurisdiction over third-
party state law claims in admiralty.82 The courts addressed the
74. Leather's Best, 451 F.2d at 810-11 n.12.
75. 360 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
76. 44 F.R.D. 34.
77. Stinson, 360 F. Supp. at 675-76 (Judge Noel noted that McCann had "caused con-
siderable comment").
78. Id. at 676.
79. See supra note 31, § (c).
80. The events were: (1) an accident on board which caused physical injuries; (2) a prior
accident which resulted in neurosis.
81. See supra note 31.
82. Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Union Comp. Corporation, 489 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1974),
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question, but failed to resolve it because, for various reasons, the
cases never properly framed the issue.
In the first of the cases, 83 the Fifth Circuit was presented with
a situation involving a ship's collision with a railroad bridge that
spanned a channel of water. The collision occurred due to the
crew's loss of visibility caused by smoke emanating from the
smokestacks of a pulp and paper mill located on a bank of the
channel. The district court denied both ancillary and independent
admiralty jurisdiction over the ship's third-party complaint against
the paper mill. The court based its decision on Executive Jetavia-
tion, Inc. v. City of Cleveland8 4 and Pentayvin v. GEIC0. 5 The
Court of Appeals treated the question of ancillary jurisdiction as a
secondary issue to its decision in the case. A decision on ancillary
jurisdiction would be rendered by the court only if it could affirm
the trial court's finding of no independent basis that admiralty ju-
risdiction existed over such claims.
The court never reached the jurisdictional question. The court
held not only that the cited cases failed to support the district
court's conclusion that no admiralty jurisdiction existed, but, to
the contrary, it found that the cases actually sustained the juris-
diction."' The non-maritime nature of the agency that obstructed
navigation in the channel was irrelevant and the maritime nature
of the tort undeniable. The court of appeals' finding of admiralty
jurisdiction over the ship's third-party complaint against the mill
dispensed with the need to decide the ancillary jurisdiction
question."
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit addressed
the existing treatments of the issue. This court was presented also
with a case in which it could not resolve the same issue of jurisdic-
tion.8 8 In the case of Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen
Lines, Inc., the jurisdictional question arose in a claim concerning
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974); Rosario v. American Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531
F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
83. Gypsum Carrier, 489 F.2d at 152.
84. 409 U.S. 249 (1972)(holding that, for purposes of invoking admiralty jurisdiction, a
maritime tort must have occurred in relation to a "traditional maritime activity").
85. 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972).
86. Gypsum Carrier, 489 F.2d at 154.
87. This resolution of the case was consistent with the court's contention that ancillary
jurisdiction was secondary to a primary independent basis of federal jurisdiction, as is
admiralty.
88. Rosario, 531 F.2d at 1227.
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a seaman's injury. The plaintiff sued his employer under the Jones
Act 8 ' and for maintenance and cure." The employer, in turn,
sought indemnity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) from
the United States for inadequate medical treatment of the seaman
provided by a facility of the United States Public Health Service.' 1
Once the United States was impleaded by the defendant/third-
party plaintiff, as a third-party defendant, the plaintiff/seaman
filed a direct claim under the FTCA against the United States.92
The court's decision that the seaman's claim was original, and
not a third-party action, once again made it unnecessary for the
court to rule on the matter. Although no ruling was made, the
court recognized well-established contentions of both commenta-
tors and district courts that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
could apply to state law claims in admiralty cases. Courts of ap-
peal, however, had not adopted the ancillary jurisdiction
argument.' 3
The diversity jurisdiction of federal courts also served to re-
lieve at least one court from deciding the jurisdictional issue.'4 In
Oroco Marine, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine Services, Inc., the court found
diversity and referred to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction as a
"special 'back-up' jurisdictional theory (which) is not necessary if
the court determines that a primary jurisdictional base
exists. . .. "95
Morse Electro Products Corp. v. S.S. Great Peace" was the
first modern published opinion in which the ancillary jurisdiction
was specifically found to exist. The district court dismissed the ju-
risdictional claim, reasoning that because diversity was not alleged
in the complaint, the court was barred from "considering the pro-
priety of exercising diversity jurisdiction.' 1 7 The court proceeded
to decide the case without diversity by relying strictly upon the
admiralty jurisdiction of the district court.
In Morse, cartons of 8-track tapes were misdelivered into the
89. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1982).
90. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 51, § 6-6.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
92. This direct claim under the FTCA was captioned as a third-party claim.
93. Rosario, 531 F.2d at 1228 n.17.
94. Oroco Marine, Inc. v. National Marine Service, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 220 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
95. Id. at 223.
96. 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977).
97. See Leather's Best, 451 F.2d at 809 n.10.
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hands of thieves who falsified documents obtained from the plain-
tiff/shipper's customs broker. Admiralty jurisdiction over the origi-
nal claim existed based on the bill of lading, a maritime contract,
issued by the carrier to the plaintiff. All other claims between vari-
ous parties, including original claims for indemnification, cross-
claims, and third-party claims, were founded upon state tort and
contract law. Consequently, the district court had to answer ques-
tions regarding the existence of both pendent and ancillary juris-
diction over non-maritime causes of action in admiralty. It an-
swered both questions in the affirmative. Legal precedent at the
appellate level for pendent jurisdiction had existed for six years,98
but no such precedent existed with regard to ancillary jurisdiction.
The Morse court was the first district court to find ancillary
jurisdiction over non-maritime claims in an admiralty suit. It did
so, however, without considering the constitutional right to trial by
jury. Because the parties failed to make a demand for a jury trial,
the issue concerning the deprivation of a right guaranteed by the
seventh amendment became a moot question.99
By 1978, ancillary jurisdiction was completely legitimized in
the district courts. In Tatlow and Pledger v. Hermann Forwarding
Company,100 citing to Leather's Best, Inc., the court claimed "ju-
risdiction by virtue of the admiralty and maritime laws, as well as
by reason of Ancillary Jurisdiction,'' 1 and proceeded to decide the
case on its merits. In a 1980 opinion,1 02 a Louisiana District Court,
after recognizing that the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the prob-
lem, ruled in favor of allowing ancillary jurisdiction. The court
stated:
I feel compelled to add my weight to the growing body of judi-
cial authority allowing a cause of action lacking independent
grounds of jurisdiction to be appended under Rule 14(c) to an
admiralty claim, as long as it passes the traditional "same
claim" test used for ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 14(a)
impleader.' °'
Once again, the court found the jury trial issue to be irrelevant.
The basis of such a finding was not because the parties failed to
98. Id.
99. 437 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1977).
100. 456 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
101. Id. at 353.
102. Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Service, 87 F.R.D. 353 (E.D. La. 1980).
103. Id. at 355.
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demand a jury, but rather because the case included a claim under
the Jones Act and, therefore, all claims would be tried before a
jury.
The issue of whether an impleaded party's right to a jury trial
on a civil claim would prevent the third-party claim from being
brought in a maritime action, was resolved on the district court
level in 1977 in Fawcett v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc.104 The
court held that a legal claim10 5 could be impleaded into a maritime
action without hindering the third-party defendant's right to a jury
trial. The court reasoned that such a claim retained its civil nature
and carried with it the right to a jury trial, even if it was im-
pleaded as part of a maritime cause of action. Persuaded by the
logic of the commentators,106 the court stated:
After careful consideration of the conflicting authorities on this
issue, the Court concludes that the better view is that espoused
by Messrs. Wright and Miller and, apparently, the Courts of Ap-
peal for the Second and Ninth Circuits, i.e., that such claims are
cognizable under the doctrine of Ancillary Jurisdiction and that
they are not thereby transformed into claims in Admiralty, but
retain their legal character and the accompanying procedural
incidents. 10 7
The resolution of the jury trial question at the district court
level removed the last of the underlying objections to the
cognizability of impleader of non-maritime causes of action in
admiralty. Any additional legitimizing of ancillary jurisdiction
would need to come from a court of appeals.
IV. ANCILLARY JURISDICTION FINALLY RECOGNIZED: Joiner v.
Diamond M. Drilling Company
The issue concerning ancillary jurisdiction over third-party
claims was squarely before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in 1982, when the court decided the case of
Joiner v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 108 which is factually similar to
the controversial McCann decision.109 In Joiner, the widow of a
104. 76 F.R.D. 519 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
105. A claim in law as opposed to an admiralty claim.
106. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 12.
107. Fawcett, 76 F.R.D. at 521.
108. 677 F.2d 1035 (5th Cir. 1982).
109. 44 F.R.D. 34 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
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deceased seaman brought suit against the decedent's maritime em-
ployer and also against the manufacturer of the defective ship-
board equipment involved in the accident that killed the seaman.
Each of the defendants impleaded a Louisiana physician whose
medical malpractice was alleged to have caused the death of the
decedent. 110 The case came before the court of appeals after the
lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the third-party
defendant."'
Although the district court reached the merits of the third-
party claims, the appellate court reviewed the threshold issue of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The court scrutinized every
possible form of subject matter jurisdiction which could have been
exercised over the third-party claims. Because it had taken many
years for the right case to reach a court of appeals, the opinion
evidences the deliberateness of the court in its intent to be crystal
clear in its holding." 2
The court first rejected appellants' argument that the third-
party claims could be heard independently under the federal
court's admiralty jurisdiction. Appellants argued that an implied
maritime contract was entered into when the impleaded doctor
treated the injured seaman on their behalf. The physician's alleged
malpractice constituted a breach of this implied contract, similar
to a breach of an implied warranty for workmanlike performance.
The court, in refusing to adopt this argument, adhered to prior
precedent which held that a private, land-locked physician who
treats a patient injured at sea, does not thereby enter into an im-
plied maritime contract."' The district court's (independent) ad-
miralty jurisdiction over the third party claim was thus foreclosed.
The court ruled also that diversity jurisdiction was precluded.
110. The decedent's employer filed its third-party complaint against the doctor before
the plaintiff amended her complaint to add the mud tank manufacturer as a defendant.
Both defendants then settled their claims with Joiner's estate prior to the trial. While it was
not until after the resolution of these claims that the mud tank manufacturer filed its third-
party claim against the doctor, the district court continued to exercise jurisdiction over both
third-party claims. The physician responded to these claims with a motion to dismiss. The
district court entertained the motion for summary judgment and held for the doctor on the
merits applying Louisiana state law.
111. Joiner, 677 F.2d at 1037.
112. For instance, at the beginning of the opinion the court is careful to identify who
the "maritime" parties are in the case. The court then deals with each individual form of
original federal subject matter jurisdiction that the parties contend is cognizable on the
third-party claim, eliminating each, to arrive at ancillary jurisdiction.
113. Penn Tanker v. United States, 409 F.2d 514, 517-18 (5th Cir. 1969).
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The district court could not exercise diversity jurisdiction over the
third-party claims because the appellants failed to make sufficient
jurisdictional allegations in their complaints.
Next, the court considered the question of whether the district
court had ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party claims. The
court's analysis of this issue is awkward because the court at-
tempted to use this particular case to rule on a point which it con-
sidered to be important, even though the facts did not fit the hold-
ing. The court divided the ancillary jurisdiction issue into two
questions. The first question was whether the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction was applicable in the context of admiralty impleader.
The second question was whether the district court should have
retained ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party state law claims
where the primary federal claims had been settled prior to trial.
1 4
The court found it necessary to break down the issue of ancil-
lary jurisdiction, because the facts of the case indicated that the
principal admiralty claims upon which federal subject matter juris-
diction was founded were resolved prior to trial. In addition, one of
the third-party claims was filed four days after the settlement of
those admiralty claims.
The court held that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction was
applicable in the contexts of both civil and admiralty impleader. It
found also that the district court erred in continuing to exercise
ancillary jurisdiction over the third-party state law claims, where
such claims were filed after the federal claims were dismissed or
settled, or where no special circumstances existed which justified
the retention of the lingering claims.11 5
The crucial language of the opinion reads as follows:
We believe that the considerations of judicial economy which
provide the principal justification for the exercise of Ancillary
Jurisdiction in civil cases apply with equal force in the context
of Admiralty impleader. Now that the rules of Admiralty and
Civil Procedure have been merged, we see no statutory or consti-
114. If the court had not dissected the question, its decision could conceivably have
been interpreted as deciding that a federal court continues to have jurisdiction over state
law claims when the main federal claims have been settled, a holding with troublesome, or
awkward potential if not reversed.
115. Joiner has become a leading case in this area of federal jurisdiction. See Am. Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co. v. Bailey, 750 F.2d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 1984); Bernstein v. Lind-Waldock
& Co., 738 F.2d 179, 187 (7th Cir. 1984); Waste Systems, Inc. v. Clean Land Air Corp., 683
F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1982).
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tutional impediment to the exercise of Ancillary Jurisdiction
over state law claims appended to Admiralty actions ...
Therefore we hold that a third party claim lacking independent
grounds of jurisdiction may be appended to an Admiralty action
and is cognizable in Federal Court under the doctrine of Ancil-
lary Jurisdiction so long as the ancillary claim arises out of the
same core of operative facts as the main Admiralty action."'
To date, only one citation to Joiner within the context of this
Comment has been noted in reported appellate opinions.' 1 7 Joiner
is cited primarily in the area of retention of jurisdiction by federal
courts over pendent claims and parties where federal subject mat-
ter jurisdiction ceases to exist.118 In addition, it is cited for the re-
tention of federal jurisdiction over claims that would be barred by
statutes of limitation should they need to be refiled in state
court.19
Nevertheless, from the single mention that the case received
from a court of appeals within the context of ancillary jurisdiction,
it appears that the principles which Joiner has outlined for admi-
ralty impleader have been judicially accepted. In that case, In re:
Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its own
rejection of pendent party jurisdiction where a party is impleaded
into a diversity action and the third-party claim does not meet the
minimum jurisdictional amount under 28 U.S.C. §1332.120 The
court stated that "the admiralty setting is distinguishable. The tra-
dition of liberal joinder, reflected in Rule 14(c), illustrates the
strong admiralty policy in favor of providing efficient procedures
for resolving maritime disputes.""'1 Ancillary jurisdiction over non-
maritime causes of action in admiralty seems to be evolving toward
settled law.
V. CONCLUSION
The modern federal court system is engaged on a course of
increasing the efficiency and cost effectiveness of the judicial pro-
cess. Judicial economy and the avoidance of circuity of actions are
116. Joiner, 677 F.2d at 1040-41.
117. In re: Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1983).
118. See supra note 115.
119. El Shawawy v. Harrison, 755 F.2d 1432 (11th Cir. 1985).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that the minimum jurisdictional amount in a diversity
action is $10,000.
121. In re: Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d at 914.
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at the heart of modern rules of procedure which facilitate the reso-
lution of numerous disputes among several related parties in a sin-
gle judicial proceeding. Ancillary jurisdiction in the federal courts
is one of the tools available for the purpose of achieving judicial
economy in the system.
Judge Hough's efforts in the 1906 case of Evans v. New York
& P.S.S. Co. 122 were suppressed by a court system that was in-
clined toward preserving the purity of separate legal systems,
rather than achieving the efficiency that is so desirable by modern
standards. The purists' notions may have been correct in light of a
court system that functioned under the separate sides of civil and
admiralty jurisdiction. Unification of the Civil and Admiralty
Rules in 1966, however, mooted the desires of the purists, as now
every federal judge hears and decides both civil and admiralty
cases.
The most dramatic consequence of this evolution is the final
vindication of Judge Hough and the Evans doctrine. After seventy
years of disapproval, impleader of non-maritime causes of action is
once again possible in admiralty "in order to prevent circuity of
action and multiplicity of suits. ' 1
23
Ernesto J. de la F6
122. Evans 163 F. at 408.
123. Id. at 407.
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